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Summary 
Intrusion alert correlation is multi-step processes that receives 
alerts from heterogeneous log resources as input and produce a 
high-level description of the malicious activity on the network. 
The objective of this study is to analyse the current alert 
correlation technique and identify the significant criteria in 
each technique that can improve the Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) problem such as prone to alert flooding, contextual 
problem, false alert and scalability. The existing alert 
correlation techniques had been reviewed and analysed. From 
the analysis, six capability criteria have been identified to 
improve the current alert correlation technique. They are 
capability to do alert reduction, alert clustering, identify multi-
step attack, reduce false alert, detect known attack and detect 
unknown attack. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Computer security offers three types of security 
mechanism to protect a system which are authentication, 
authorisation and auditing.  These three mechanisms are 
essential for securing the systems against attack.  
However, if the design and implementation of these 
mechanisms are flaws, an additional protection is needed. 
In order to provide an extra layer of defence, IDS have 
been proposed.  Intrusion detection technology has 
gained increasing acceptance in enterprise networks, with 
both commercially supported and open source 
components widely deployed [1].  However, it has few 
weaknesses such as prone to alert flooding, contextual 
problem due to attacks are likely to generate multiple 
related alert, false alert and scalability [4] and correlation 
is proposed to overcome these weaknesses.   
 Devices and sensor diversity has resulted in a new 
difficulty in generating reports due to the unmanageable 
amount of alert.  Inspecting thousand of alerts per day is 
not feasible, especially if 99% of them are false positives 
[8].  Referring to Fig. 1, in view of domain perspective, 
heterogeneous log resources can be gained from host, 
network, application, sensor and wireless.  It can be 
argued that diverse intrusion detection sensor and 
heterogeneous log resources provide more complete 
coverage of the attack space. However, the potential 
added leverage from devices diversity is not clear that 
require the security administrator’s decision on which 
reports pertains to the same or to different incidents. This 
issue has motivated the researcher to do research on 
correlation of alert produce by intrusion detection sensor 
and heterogeneous log resources.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Domain perspective of heterogeneous log resources 
 
2. What is Alert and Intrusion Correlation? 
 
According to [7], alert is defined as an alarm generated 
by Intrusion Detection system (IDS), to notify interested 
parties of interesting event.  An event is a low level 
entity analysed by IDS.  Single event can cause multiple 
alerts and it can be represented in mathematical 
expression as below: 
 
Event = {alert1, alert2, alert3…..alertn} 
 
Intrusion correlation refers to the interpretation, 
combination and analysis of information from all 
available sources about the target system activity for the 
purpose of intrusion detection and response. There are 
two types of intrusion correlation as in Fig. 2; intrusion 
event correlation and intrusion alert correlation [6].   
Heterogeneous log 
resources 
Host (e.g 
workstation) 
Network 
(e.g router, 
firewall, NIDs) 
Application (e.g 
Web access log, 
Web error log) 
Wireless 
 (e.g Access Point 
authentication) 
Sensor (e.g 
NIDs, HIDs) 
IJCSNS International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, VOL.8 No.9, September 2008 133
 
Fig. 2  Types of Intrusion Correlation 
 
The main difference between these two types of intrusion 
correlations is that intrusion event correlation analyses 
neutral events, meanwhile intrusion alert correlation 
analyses identified misuse or anomalies.  This relation is 
also stated in IDMEF specification [3] specifying that 
each time an analyzer detect an event that match the rule, 
it sends an alert to its manager(s).  It will depend on the 
analyser as an alert message can correspond to a single 
detected event, or multiple detected events.  Intrusion 
event correlation is important for forensic investigation 
whereby intrusion alert correlation is important for 
security administrator and this study will concentrate on 
intrusion alert correlation  
 
2.1  Intrusion Alert Correlation 
 
Alert can be produced from various types of sources and 
it may cause multiple stages of attack.   Alert correlation 
is multi-step processes that receives alerts from one or 
more IDS as input and produce a high-level description 
of the malicious activity on the network.  According to 
[7], to achieve good recognition, the data needs to be 
collected from various sources (for example firewall, 
web server logs, IDS of multiple manufacturers and so 
on).  Correlation of alerts produced by heterogeneous log 
resources can provide a number of potential advantages 
and the most obvious benefit is the reduction in the 
number of alerts that a security officer must address.  
 When considering single log resource, a correlation 
engine can reduce alert volume by organizing numerous 
alerts that are part of an ongoing attack, namely known 
as alert threading. In the case of heterogeneous log 
resources, a correlation engine should recognize when 
reports from multiple log resources refer to the same 
incident. Correlation is the degree to which one or more 
attributes or measurements on the same group of 
elements show a tendency to vary together.  Correlation 
can enhance detection capability, and give a more 
complete picture of attacks that an individual sensor or 
devices may observe only partially without losing the 
security-relevant information. In addition, correlation can 
exploit the complementary coverage from several log 
resources. Reports from several log resources employing 
diverse analytical techniques may reinforce each other 
and therefore enhance the confidence of the detection.   
 
3. Classification of Alert Correlation 
Technique 
 
There are three famous techniques exist in correlating 
alerts which are Similarity-based, Pre-defined attack 
scenarios and Pre-requisites and consequences of 
individual attack [14].  In addition, [12] has introduced 
one more technique for alert correlation, known as 
Statistical causal analysis (refer to Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Classification of Alert Correlation Technique 
 
3.1  Similarity-Based 
 
Similarity-based technique will compare an alert to all 
alert threads that have similar attributes or features (e.g 
source IP address, destination IP address, ports) and then 
correlates alerts with a high degree of feature similarity if 
match or a new thread is created if none is match  [9],  
[13].  
 [13] has implemented alert similarity metric using 
Emerald in three phases as in Fig. 4.  In the first phase, 
the low-level events is aggregated using the attack 
threads concepts to cluster alert that are part of the same 
ongoing attack.  The alerts are clustered if attribute is 
overlap which mean that it will only consider attributes 
that present in both alerts.   
 The metric for this phase demand that sensor field, 
attack class, attack name, source and target in both alerts 
are similar.  In second phase, different levels of similarity 
are expected for different attributes in different situation 
whereby similar sensor field is dropped and similar alert 
name is maintained. This phase is to ensure that detection 
of the same attack by multiple sensors should be fused. 
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Fig. 4  Similarity-based intrusion alert correlation process by Valdes & 
Skinner 
 
 Then in third phase,  it requires similar attack class 
in both alert.  Certain threshold is adjust for example for 
synthetic threads, sensor id and IP is set high and for 
multistep attack detection, threshold for attack class is set 
to low. This phase will merge alerts representing 
different attack steps to provide a higher-level view of 
the security state of the system. 
 
3.2  Pre-Defined Attack Scenarios 
 
This technique utilizes the fact that intrusions often 
require several actions to take place in order to succeed.  
Every attack scenario has corresponding steps required 
for the successfulness of the attack.  Low- level alerts 
from IDS are compared against the pre-defined attack 
scenario before the alerts can be correlated. It is 
restricted to known attack and misuse detection only and 
specified by human users or learned through training 
datasets.  The example of implementation is ASL (Attack 
Specification Language). 
 [4] has presented a detailed semantic alert model and 
developed adapter modules to map proprietary alert 
formats into this model.  This alert model was further 
refined and is now the de-facto format for intrusion 
detection alerts known as Intrusion Detection Exchange 
Format (IDMEF).  They have proposed a system that 
performs correlation and aggregation of intrusion 
detection alerts produced by various sensor as in Fig. 5.  
In correlation phase, there are two types of correlation 
which are duplicate removal and consequence 
correlation.   
 
 
 
Fig. 5  Pre-defined attack scenarios intrusion alert correlation process 
by Debar & Wespi 
 
 Duplicates are instances of the same attack as 
detected using rules read from a specified configuration 
file by two different sensor.  Consequences are rules that 
specify one event should be followed by another type of 
event.  It will link together alerts that are sequential in 
nature.  Once alerts has correlated, aggregation phase 
will cluster alerts with similar attributes (source, target 
and attack class).  It identifies the source of the attack, 
the target of the attack and popular attack class.  It will 
group alerts based on certain criteria to aggregate 
severity level, reveal trends and clarify attacker’s 
intentions.  This phase consists of large number of false 
positive, however there is no specific technique can 
eliminate this problem.  Major weakness of this method 
are, it requires that human users specify attack scenarios 
and it is limited to detection of known attacks. 
 
3.3  Pre-Requisites and Consequences of individual 
attacks 
 
This technique work at a higher level than correlation 
based on attributes similarities, but a lower level then 
correlation based on known scenarios.  Pre-conditions 
are defined as the necessary conditions that must exist for 
the attack to be successful, and the consequences for the 
attack are defined as conditions that may exist after a 
specific attack has occurred.  It is represented as a logical 
formula using AND and OR connectives.  This technique 
is not restricted to known attack scenarios and its 
uncover the causal relationship between alerts.  Most of 
the approaches using this method are focused on the 
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modeling and detection of multistep attacks to provide a 
high-level of the attack associated with a security 
compromise. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6  Pre-requisite and Consequences of individual attack intrusion 
alert correlation process by Cuppens & Miege 
 
 By using these techniques as depicted in Fig. 6,  [2] 
has include five functions including alert base 
management, alert clustering, alert merging, alert 
correlation and intention recognition function.  In alert 
base management function, it receives alerts generated 
by IDS and stores them for further analysis by 
cooperation module.  This alert will be normalized to 
IDMEF format and store in the relational database.  Alert 
cluster and alert merging function can access the 
database and will use the similarity function to cluster 
and merge the alert.  Alert correlation function will 
further analyzes the cluster alerts provided by alert 
merging function using explicit correlation rules with 
pre-defined and consequence statement.  This approach 
attempt to generate correlation rules automatically which 
can introduce correlated alerts that are similar by chance 
and this could increase the noise in the alert stream.  
 [10], [11] has implemented causal relationships 
between alerts using pre-requisite and consequences .  
Hyper-alerts connected graph are created and graph-
manipulation techniques are applied to reduce these 
connected alerts into manageable alert.  This approach 
can correlate alerts in the middle of attack chain even if 
the start of the chain is missed.  This can be useful in the 
case of intruder can pass through the access-list of router 
unnoticable and easily attack the server in the LAN.  It 
can correlate the second and third attack even if the pre-
conditions of the second alert were not met.  This system 
can generate graph which is useful in determining the 
attacker’s objective. 
 
3.4  Statistical Causal Analysis 
 
This technique by [12] as shown in Fig. 7, implements 
anomaly detection and use Granger Causality Test (time 
series analysis method) to correlate events which 
emphasis on attack scenario analysis.  In order to reduce 
the volume of raw alerts, it will combine low-level alert 
based on alert attributes.  It uses clustering technique to 
process low-level alert-data into high-level aggregated 
alerts.  Prioritization alerts is used based on relevance of 
attacks and impacts on the mission goal.  It will then 
conduct causality analysis to correlate alerts and 
constructs attack scenario.  It is pure statistical causality 
analysis and does not need pre-defined knowledge about 
attack scenarios.  Hence, new attack scenarios can be 
identified.   
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Statistical Causality Analysis alert correlation process by Qin & 
Le 
 
 This technique declares that every multi-step attack 
will generate alert that have statistical similarities in their 
attributes, and this attack steps have causal relationship.  
[12] run the statistical correlation engine offline with 
training datasets to compute and store correlations so that 
it can be used for pattern matching at run-time.  This 
technique is not a feasible solution for the complete 
correlation process.  However it can be utilized as a part 
of a larger system to pre-process alerts or to provide 
meta-alert signatures. 
 
4. Discussion and Analysis of Alert 
Correlation Technique 
 
4.1 Alert Correlation Techniques Comparison 
 
All techniques have their advantages and 
disadvantageous as summarized in Table 1.  Referring to 
this table, further analysis has been done in order to 
produce the capability criteria. 
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Table 1: Alert Correlation Technique Comparison 
Technique Advantage Disadvantage 
 
Similarity-based 
• Can reduce large number of 
redundant alert generated by 
multiple sensors. 
• False alert can only be detected if multiple 
sensors can detect the same attack. 
• Cannot detect multi-step attack 
• Can detect only misuse detection and not 
anomaly detection. 
 
Pre-defined attack 
scenario 
• Can reduce large number of 
redundant alert generated by 
multiple sensors  
• Can cluster multiple related alert 
(contextual alert) 
• Can detect precise attack as stated 
in the rules (specification). 
• Could generate large number of false 
positive alarm [5] 
• it requires that users specify attack scenarios 
manually 
• It is limited to detection of known attacks or 
misuse detection and not anomaly detection.
• multi-step attack alert is disregarded 
 
 
Pre-requisites and 
Consequences of 
individual attack 
• Multi-step attack can be detected to 
provide a high-level view of the 
attack associated with a security 
compromise 
• [10] generate useful graph to 
determine the attacker’s objective  
• Automatic generation correlation rules can 
generate large false alarm [2]. 
 
Statistical Causality 
Analysis 
• does not need pre-defined 
knowledge about attack scenarios. 
• Using anomaly detection technique 
• new attack scenarios can be 
identified 
• can be used as pre-process alerts or 
meta-alert signatures. 
• Not feasible for complete correlation process 
[7]. 
 
4.2   Proposed Criteria for Alert Correlation 
Technique   
 
Four important intrusion alert correlation techniques has 
been reviewed and analysed.  The objective of this study 
is to analyse the current alert correlation technique and 
identify the significant criteria within each technique 
which can improve the IDS problem.  As mentioned by 
[4], IDS has developed issues on alert flooding, 
contextual problem, false alert and scalability.  The 
characteristic that shall be analysed in each alert 
correlation technique is according to the issue listed in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Issues analysed in IDS  
No IDS Issue Description Propose Solution 
1 Alert 
flooding 
IDS are prone to alert flooding as they provide a 
large number of alerts to the security officer, 
who then has the difficulties coping with the 
load. 
1. To reduce number of alert generated from IDS.
 
2 Contextual 
problem 
Attacks are likely to generate multiple related 
alerts.  Current IDS do not make it easy for 
security officers to logically group related alerts.
1. To group or cluster alert which has a related 
event or event threaded. 
2. To identify multi-step attack 
3 False Alert Existing IDS are likely to generate false 
positives or false negatives alerts 
1. To reduce number of false alerts 
2. To identify known attack using misuse 
detection 
3. To identify unknown attack using anomaly 
detection 
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Based on the IDS current issues, most of the current alert 
correlation techniques were developed in order to 
improve this problem.  Therefore the proposed criterion 
that shall be analysed is according to the capability 
criteria as listed below: 
 
1. Capability to do alert reduction 
2. Capability to do alert clustering 
3. Capability to identify multi-step attack. 
4. Capability to reduce false alert. 
5. Capability to detect known attack 
6. Capability to detect unknown attack 
 
 Alert reduction is required in order to overcome the 
problem of alert flooding or large amount of alert data 
generated by the IDS.  This capability criterion is 
important in order to reduce the security officer’s tension 
in performing troubleshooting when analysing the exact 
attacker in their environment.   
 For second criteria, alert clustering is considered as 
important as it can cluster multiple related alerts and at 
the same time reduce the number of alert by ignoring the 
similar alert generated by different sensors or 
heterogeneous log resources.   
 The third criteria, most of the alert correlation 
technique is incapable to detect multi-step attack.  
Therefore this capability is required as attacker behaviour 
is becoming more sophisticated and it shall involve one 
to many, many to one and many to many attacks.   
 For fourth criteria, most of the IDS have the 
tendency to produce false alarm.  This false alarm 
reduction criterion is important as it closely related to 
alert flooding issue.   
 The fifth and sixth criterion, the capability to detect 
both known and unknown attack is required to ensure 
that the alert generated will overcome the issue of alert 
flooding and false alert.  Table 3, is the summary of 
analysis from each alert correlation techniques match 
with the proposed capability criteria. 
 Based on the analysis, all of the techniques have the 
same capability to reduce and cluster the alert, and detect 
known attack except for pre-requisite and consequences 
of individual attack and statistical causality technique.  
The additional capability of pre-requisite and 
consequences of individual attack is to identify multi-
step attack whereas the unknown attack can be detected 
using statistical causality technique.   
 The analysis also shown that, most of the researchers 
[7],[5],[2] identified that all of these techniques are 
incapable to reduce false alert.  This has given an 
implication that there is a room for improvement in 
detecting known and unknown attack, and multi-step 
attack as these capability criteria shall overcome large 
number of false alert problem. Based on the study, a 
proposed an improved solution for alert correlation 
technique will use combination of all techniques to 
complement each other weakness.  For example, in the 
alert correlation process for pre-requisites and 
consequences of individual attack technique in Fig. 6, the 
alert clustering will use the similarity-based and pre-
defined attack scenarios technique.    
 
Table 3: Alert correlation technique versus proposed capability criteria. 
(capable=√, incapable=×) 
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Similarity-based 
 
√ √ × × √ ×
Pre-defined  
Attack Scenarios 
 
√ √ × × √ ×
Pre-requisites and  
consequences of  
individual attack 
√ √ √ × √ ×
Statistical Causality 
 
√ √ × × √ √
 
5.0 Conclusion and Future Works  
 
In this study, researcher have reviewed and analysed the 
existing alert correlation technique to overcome the 
IDS’s problems discussed.  From the analysis researcher 
propose an improved solution for alert correlation 
technique based on six capability criteria identified 
which are capability to do alert reduction, capability to 
do alert clustering, capability to identify multi-step attack, 
capability to reduce false alert, capability to detect 
known attack and capability to detect unknown attack.   
According to the capability criteria, all alert correlation 
techniques should be implemented in the alert correlation 
process. Further improvement should be done on the 
process of detecting the known and unknown attack, and 
multi-step attack as these capability criteria shall 
overcome large number of false alert problem.  Therefore 
further research on intrusion alert correlation technique 
with these capabilities to detect unknown attack using 
combination of anomaly and misuse detection approach 
is required.   
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